8.30.2006
Viability Of Claim For Conversion Of Electronic Data Certified To New York Court
In Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2006), a former insurance agent who leased a computer system from his principal sued for conversion when the insurance company reclaimed the computer. The agent had installed various software of his own on the leased system and created electronic documents with that software, all of which he alleged were converted when the company took the computer.
The district court dismissed conversion claims based on the fact that the company owned the computer, but the Second Circuit disagreed that such ownership interest alone was a barrier to the claim. However, it analyzed New York law concerning the applicability of conversion claims to intangible property and found the matter “unsettled.” It certified the question of whether “a claim for the conversion of electronic data [is] cognizable under New York law.”
8.18.2006
Sixth Circuit Finds Rule 26(a)(2) Requires Disclosure Of All Information Provided To Testifying Experts
Since 1993, courts have split over the issue of whether work product that attorneys provide to their retained testifying experts must be disclosed. Beginning with Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289 (W.D. Mich. 1995), some district courts have held that work product shared with a testifying expert does not necessarily need to be produced because Rule 26(b)(3) and (4) retain some protections for work product.
However, in Regional Airport Authority the Sixth Circuit overruled the Haworth rule and found that amended Rule 26(a)(2) trumps Rule 26(b)(3) and (4).
8.15.2006
Third Circuit Examines Split Regarding Preclusive Effect Of Alternative Findings
In Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 05-4321, 2006 WL 2337267 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2006), the Third Circuit observed that the First Restatement of Judgments adopted the view that any alternative findings should be given equally preclusive effect, but 40 years later the Second Restatement reached the opposite conclusion, refusing to give preclusive effect to alternative findings that were each independently sufficient to support the judgment. The federal courts of appeal have split behind those two positions, with the majority following the First Restatement.
The Third Circuit rejected the Second Restatement position and sided with the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.
8.11.2006
Time To Appeal Of Class Certification Ruling Not Extended By Renewed Motion
In Carpenter v. Boeing Co., No. 04-3334, 2006 WL 2244242 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2006), the Tenth Circuit held that the 10-day period is not subject to extension through the filing of a motion seeking the district court’s reconsideration of its ruling. In the Carpenter case, plaintiffs filed a petition within 10 days after the district court denied their “renewed” motion for class certification. The appellate court viewed that motion as a motion to reconsider, and dismissed the petition as untimely.
8.10.2006
Substitution Of Correct Defendant After Expiration Of Statute Of Limitations Denied
In Locklear v. Bergman & Beving AB, No. 04-2506, 2006 WL 2244532 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 2006), a plaintiff sued a company it named “Hassleholms Mekanisk AB” in a products liability complaint filed shortly before the statute of limitations expired. Plaintiff claimed that company was the manufacturer of equipment responsible for his personal injuries.
Subsequently he learned that the manufacturers actually were entities called “Luna AB” and “Bergman & Beving AB.” After allowing him to amend the complaint to substitute those parties as defendants, the court dismissed the complaint as time-barred because the original complaint did not toll the statute of limitations against the new defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3).
In affirming, the Fourth Circuit noted that where the Rule speaks in terms of relation-back in the case of a “mistake concerning the identity of the proper party,” courts distinguish between “mistake due to a lack of knowledge and mistake due to a misnomer.” A complaint amended to correct a mere misnomer relates back to the original complaint for limitations purposes, but a correction such as the one in Locklear to add a new party that the plaintiff simply did not know about “drags a new defendant into the case” and does not relate back.
7.15.2006
Defendant May Not Substitute Diverse Party Where Plaintiff Sued “Wrong” Entity
In Salazar v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, Inc., No. 04-41043 (5th Cir. July 10, 2006), plaintiff sued for breach of contract and bad faith the entity he believed was his insurer. That entity was a Texas resident, and plaintiff sued in state court. In fact, however, the issuer of the policy was Allstate Illinois, and if plaintiff had sued that company instead Allstate could have removed based on diversity.
Allstate Texas filed removal papers and then moved to add Allstate Illinois and dismiss Allstate Texas. The district court granted those motions and refused to remand the case.
The Fifth Circuit held that this type of substitution is improper. While Rules 17, 19 and 21 might apply in a typical misjoinder or fraudulent joinder case, here only one party had ever been named as a defendant. In that situation, the district court lacked jurisdiction at the outset and substitution could not be used to create federal jurisdiction.
6.22.2006
Federal Government Is A “Person” Amenable To Service Of A Rule 45 Subpoena
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has rejected the assertion by the federal government that it is not subject to Rule 45 because it is not a “person.”
In Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 05-5197, 2006 WL 1651050 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 2006), plaintiffs served a third-party subpoena on the State Department seeking certain documents relevant to their tort claims against another individual. The government objected that Rule 45(a)(1)(C) authorizes service of a subpoena only upon a “person” and that it was not within the scope of that word as used in the rules.
After an exhaustive analysis of the government’s statutory construction arguments, the court held that litigants indeed may serve third-party subpoenas upon the government because the framers of the rules intended the term “person” to include non-natural persons including the U.S. government.
6.19.2006
Administrative Closure Not Final Disposition Allowing Appeal
In CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, No. 04-60979, 2006 WL 1644828 (5th Cir. June 15, 2006), a financial services consumer brought claims in state court concerning a contract that included an arbitration clause. CitiFinancial removed the case.
While it was pending before one judge, CitiFinancial filed its own lawsuit before another judge seeking an order to compel arbitration and to stay the first case. The court granted that motion and the judge in the original case complied, “administratively closing” the case that was now stayed.
The consumer appealed the order staying the first case and compelling arbitration. The Fifth Circuit concluded that under normal circumstances it has jurisdiction over an appeal from an order compelling arbitration because such an order essentially is final. Here, however, part of the dispute was still ongoing in the original court. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the “administrative closure” did not count as ending the case, because such closures merely stay the case while removing the case from the court’s active docket for statistical purposes, without permanent dismissal.
6.18.2006
Federal Arbitration Act Does Not Authorize Nationwide Service Of Process.
In Dynegy Midstream Services, LP v. Trammochem, 451 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. June 13, 2006), several parties arbitrated a dispute before a New York panel of arbitrators. One of the parties sought to subpoena Dynegy, a Texas-based third-party, and the panel served a subpoena for documents to be produced in Houston.
After Dynegy ignored the subpoena, the interested party successfully moved to compel compliance with the subpoena in New York federal court, and Dynegy appealed.
The Second Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not authorize nationwide service of process. While it empowers arbitrators to “summon in writing any person to attend before them” and to bring documents, it also requires that service of such a summons be made in the same manner as a Rule 45 subpoena. In this case, the New York panel could not have served the Houston company under the geographic limitations of Rule 45, and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction.
6.15.2006
Appellate Court Affirming Jury Verdict Still Must State Reasoning
The Texas Supreme Court has remanded an appeal for preparation of a more informative opinion.
In Gonzalez v. McAllen Medical Center, Inc., No. 03-0939, 2006 WL 1562847 (Tex. June 9, 2006), a jury rejected the claims of medical negligence plaintiffs. On appeal, the court affirmed the verdict and disagreed with plaintiffs’ argument about the sufficiency of the evidence. However, its rejection of that argument in a single sentence that the evidence was sufficient without stating any reasons why.
In Texas, an appellate court reversing a jury verdict on sufficiency grounds must detail the evidence and clearly state why the jury’s findings were factually insufficient. Even though in affirming a verdict a much lower level of detail is needed, the Supreme Court held that the court still must provide the “basic reasons” for the decision, and not merely recite that the evidence was sufficient.