The Seventh Circuit has issued an opinion that once again illustrates the dangers of waiting until the last moment under a statute of limitations.
In Jenkins v. Village of Maywood, No. 06-3411, 2007 WL 3239198 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2007), plaintiff filed a joint stipulation for voluntary dismissal of his Section 1983 action in federal court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) on March 9, 2004. The court prepared an order of dismissal on the same day, and the clerk entered it on the docket on March 15, 2004.
One year later, on March 15, 2005, plaintiff essentially re-filed the case in federal court. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is derived from the appropriate state statute and its corresponding tolling rules. In this case, Illinois law applied and plaintiff's new case would have been out of time but for the existence of a special tolling statute. Under 735 ILCS 5/13-217, a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses a case may commence the action again within one year or within the remaining limitations period, whichever is greater. Plaintiff believed that his filing within one year of the dismissal was timely because the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure specifies that a voluntary dismissal is not effective for purposes of the one-year tolling rule until the clerk has entered the order onto the docket.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the date that plaintiff filed the stipulation controlled instead. That is because federal, not state, procedural law governs a federal case even if the applicable statute of limitations is derived from state law. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), no order is needed to effect a voluntary dismissal. It specifically states that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court ... by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action." Thus, the dismissal became effective as a matter of applicable law when plaintiff filed the stipulation on March 9, 2004, not when the clerk entered it on the docket the following week.
The moral of the story: Don't file a complaint on what you think is the last possible day. Courts might find that you did not count correctly, or that the "mailbox rule" or other tolling rule did not work the way you thought it did, and you will have left no margin for error.
Showing posts with label Voluntary Dismissal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Voluntary Dismissal. Show all posts
11.06.2007
9.25.2007
Plaintiff's Own Withdrawal Of Federal Claim Ends Jurisdiction Over State Claim
In addition to claims that fall within specific federal subject-matter jurisdiction, federal courts also are permitted to hear state-law claims pled as part of the same case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction).
It is well-established that if a defendant successfully moves to dismiss all of the claims for which federal jurisdiction exists, leaving only claims based on state law, the district court has the discretion to dismiss the state-law claims (which the plaintiff then might be able to assert in state court). District courts frequently do just that. See, e.g., Sanchez & Daniels v. Koresko, No. 07-1228, 2007 WL 2757761 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) (district court properly terminated case after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction).
The Eleventh Circuit recently considered a case in which the termination of all federal claims occurred by plaintiff’s voluntary amendment of the complaint. In contrast to the discretionary standard applicable after granting of a Rule 12 motion, in Pintando v Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2007), the court found that when a party voluntarily withdraws all claims over which the district court had original jurisdiction, the judge is required to dismiss the case. Analogizing to Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Unites States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007) [covered in a previous post], the court held that the withdrawal of allegations in an amended complaint which had formed the basis of federal jurisdiction defeats jurisdiction altogether, and the case cannot continue in federal court.
Thus, if confronted with a situation like this one, a district court may grant a motion for leave to amend, and then must immediately dismiss the case for lack of federal jurisdiction.
It is well-established that if a defendant successfully moves to dismiss all of the claims for which federal jurisdiction exists, leaving only claims based on state law, the district court has the discretion to dismiss the state-law claims (which the plaintiff then might be able to assert in state court). District courts frequently do just that. See, e.g., Sanchez & Daniels v. Koresko, No. 07-1228, 2007 WL 2757761 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) (district court properly terminated case after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction).
The Eleventh Circuit recently considered a case in which the termination of all federal claims occurred by plaintiff’s voluntary amendment of the complaint. In contrast to the discretionary standard applicable after granting of a Rule 12 motion, in Pintando v Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2007), the court found that when a party voluntarily withdraws all claims over which the district court had original jurisdiction, the judge is required to dismiss the case. Analogizing to Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Unites States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007) [covered in a previous post], the court held that the withdrawal of allegations in an amended complaint which had formed the basis of federal jurisdiction defeats jurisdiction altogether, and the case cannot continue in federal court.
Thus, if confronted with a situation like this one, a district court may grant a motion for leave to amend, and then must immediately dismiss the case for lack of federal jurisdiction.
10.30.2006
Voluntary Dismissal For Lack Of Jurisdiction Not With Prejudice Under Rule 41(a)(1)
The Seventh Circuit has clarified the interaction between Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) and 12(h)(3).
In Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. Oct. 25, 2006), defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs conceded the jurisdictional point and filed a “notice of consent to dismiss.” Defendants convinced the district court that this was both a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) and also the second time plaintiffs dismissed, and therefore the dismissal was required to be with prejudice under that rule.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed because this was not a voluntary dismissal within the definition of Rule 41(a)(1) due to its being filed later in the proceedings. Instead, plaintiff was complying with the mandate that the court be advised as soon as becoming aware of jurisdictional problems. The court’s dismissal was made in compliance with Rule 12(h)(3), not Rule 41(a)(1), and the two-dismissal rule was not implicated.
In Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. Oct. 25, 2006), defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs conceded the jurisdictional point and filed a “notice of consent to dismiss.” Defendants convinced the district court that this was both a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) and also the second time plaintiffs dismissed, and therefore the dismissal was required to be with prejudice under that rule.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed because this was not a voluntary dismissal within the definition of Rule 41(a)(1) due to its being filed later in the proceedings. Instead, plaintiff was complying with the mandate that the court be advised as soon as becoming aware of jurisdictional problems. The court’s dismissal was made in compliance with Rule 12(h)(3), not Rule 41(a)(1), and the two-dismissal rule was not implicated.
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