Under existing precedent, a plaintiff claiming violation of Sherman Act § 1 must prove not only that defendant businesses acted in parallel, but also that such conduct was the product of an agreement, combination or conspiracy. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (U.S. May 21, 2007), the Supreme Court analyzed the pleading requirements for such a claim, and concluded that it is insufficient to allege specific parallel anticompetitive conduct but describe the underlying agreement merely in conclusory terms.
Finding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)’s requirement of “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” still must put the defendant on notice of what the claim is “and the grounds upon which it rests,” the Court held that beyond mere legal conclusions enough facts also must be pled “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” because parallel conduct alone does not imply the existence of illegal conspiracy. In this particular case, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to allege the required contract as anything more than a mere conclusion.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly carries important implications beyond the antitrust context because of its departure from the traditional notion that, except as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), federal rules require only notice pleading rather than fact pleading. The Court now interprets Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), as requiring defendants to be put on notice through a certain amount of fact pleading, although the precise degree of fact pleading apparently remains to be explored through further case law.
No comments:
Post a Comment