Mandamus Granted Against Enforcement of Web-Only Amendments To Contract

The Ninth Circuit has addressed as a matter of first impression at the appellate level the question of whether a court should enforce amendments to a contract where the only notice of the changed terms consisted of the amending party posting the revised contract on its website. The court took the case on mandamus and granted the writ, effectively reversing the district court's decision to enforce.

In Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Central Dist. of California, 495 F.3d 1062 (July 18, 2007) (per curiam), plaintiff Douglas had contracted for long distance telephone service. Subsequently, the provider purported to amend the contract to add provisions unfavorable to Douglas, such as additional service charges, a choice-of-law provision applying New York law, a clause requiring disputes to be arbitrated and a waiver of class actions. The new contract was posted to the company's billing website but Douglas alleged that the company never informed its customers of the changes. Only someone who happened to check the posted contract and compared it to a prior one they had saved would have known of the amendments.

After becoming aware of the changes, Douglas filed a class action in federal court. The company moved to compel arbitration, pursuant to the arbitration clause whose addition to the contract was itself in dispute. The district court gave effect to the amendments and granted the motion. Douglas filed a petition for mandamus because he recognized that no ordinary appellate jurisdiction exists over orders compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Applying its five-factor test for mandamus petitions, the Ninth Circuit found that the prerequisites for issuance of the writ had been met. Most importantly, the district court's ruling was "clearly erroneous as a matter of law" because a party simply cannot amend a contract without its counter-party's agreement, and it is elemental that such agreement requires knowledge by the counter-party. The appellate court held:

"Parties to a contract have no obligation to check the terms on a periodic basis to learn whether they have been changed by the other side. FN: Nor would a party known when to check the website for possible changes to the contract terms without being notified that the contract has been changed and how. Douglas would have had to check the contract every day for possible changes. Without notice, an examination would be fairly cumbersome, as Douglas would have had to compare every word of the posted contract with his existing contract in order to detect whether it had changed."

The court distinguished other cases of web-based contractual updates because in each such case the poster had given some form of notice to the counter-party. Moreover, the court found that even if notice of the changes were properly given, the changes probably would not have been enforceable substantively.

The court also found that other mandamus factors were satisfied. Factors amphasizing the absence of remedy on appeal had been met becuase if Douglas were forced to arbitrate he would have had no means to ensure that he could continue as class representative. This case also satisfied the factor favoring mandamus where a district court order raises an issue of law of first impression or raises new and important problems. The Ninth Circuit viewed this case as raising for the first time an issue that would affect a multitude of situations arising from the common practice of communicating with customers through websites.

Viability Of Claim For Conversion Of Electronic Data Certified To New York Court

The Second Circuit has asked the highest court of New York state to clarify the law regarding whether a claim of conversion can exist where the property converted consists solely of electronic data.

In Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2006), a former insurance agent who leased a computer system from his principal sued for conversion when the insurance company reclaimed the computer. The agent had installed various software of his own on the leased system and created electronic documents with that software, all of which he alleged were converted when the company took the computer.

The district court dismissed conversion claims based on the fact that the company owned the computer, but the Second Circuit disagreed that such ownership interest alone was a barrier to the claim. However, it analyzed New York law concerning the applicability of conversion claims to intangible property and found the matter “unsettled.” It certified the question of whether “a claim for the conversion of electronic data [is] cognizable under New York law.”

Non-ISP Lacks Standing To Challenge Party Seeking Identity Of Internet Poster

As computer users have embraced the apparent anonymity of the Internet, businesses who find themselves the targets of online disparagement have attempted to sue the responsible parties for defamation. To do so, they often bring third-party discovery against the Internet service provider (“ISP”) to reveal the identity of the account holder who posted the defamatory remarks.

In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Doe, No. H028699 (Cal. App. (6th Dist) Apr. 18, 2006), the court observed that in a typical such case, the anonymous party normally steps forward to oppose the disclosure of his or her identity, and clearly has standing to do so. In Matrixx, however, the plaintiff was able to trace users who posted allegedly defamatory comments on a Web site to a hedge fund called Barbary Coast Capital Management, and in a deposition the principal of that company refused to answer direct questions about the identity of the posters.

The California court held that the witness in this case had no protected interest in the matter and lacked standing to assert the First Amendment rights of the anonymous posters. The court ordered the witness to answer plaintiff’s questions.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Long-Arm Jurisdiction From Obtaining Foreign Court Orders

A recent Ninth Circuit opinion considered whether long-arm jurisdiction can be triggered through a party’s bringing foreign court proceedings against an American citizen.

In Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, No. 01-17424 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2006), the popular Internet company Yahoo! brought an action in California federal court seeking a declaration that several orders entered against it in France were of no force and effect. The defendants had obtained orders from a French court finding that Yahoo! had permitted its users to use the site to sell Nazi memorabilia in violation of French law, and requiring Yahoo! to set up filters to prevent users in France from browsing the offending pages.

Eight of the eleven judges on the Ninth Circuit panel agreed that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the French defendants. Applying principles of long-arm jurisdiction, the majority concluded that the defendants “purposefully availed” themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in California and/or “purposefully directed” activities with a California party by bringing proceedings against that party in the French courts.